Late in the classic baseball movie “The Natural” (1984), the grizzled manager of the New York Knights, Pop Fisher (Wilford Brimley), is forced to remove star outfielder Roy Hobbs (Robert Redford) from the Knights’ lineup. The camera zooms in on Fisher’s decision: he crosses out the name of Hobbs, who had been slated to hit third, and replaces him with another batter. From a point of view outside of the manager’s office, we see Fisher grimace and look away from his lineup card. The thought of losing Hobbs, “the best goddamn hitter I ever saw,” is almost more than Fisher can bear.
This is largely a throwaway sequence. After all, Hobbs returns to the Knights’ lineup and (in the movie at least!) swats a pennant-clinching, walk-off home run. And yet, the scene of Fisher making out the lineup card is also freighted with baseball assumptions. First, it is simply understood that Hobbs, as the Knights’ best hitter, should hit the third in the batting order. If Fisher would’ve slotted Hobbs in the sixth hole, some form of explication would’ve been needed: “Hey, I don’t want to rush him back after an injury,” we can imagine Fisher explaining to his bench coach, Red Blow (Richard Farnsworth). Instead, the scene requires no reasoning and, in fact, no words at all. Hobbs is the team’s best hitter and, as such, the three-hitter. A second, even more understated assumption is implicit in how Fisher chooses Hobbs’ replacement. His decision is made quickly and intuitively. He does not consult a stat sheet, much less an analyst in the front office. Lineup decisions, it is suggested, are also a matter of the manager’s gut instinct. The skipper simply “knows his guys.”
Of course, “The Natural” is set in 1939, and Fisher’s managerial decisions generally reflect the thinking of that era and, indeed, others that followed. But much has changed in the twenty-first century. For example, in “The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball” (2006), Tom Tango, Mitchell Lichtman, and Andrew Dolphin argued that the nature of the batting order needed to be rethought. The leadoff hitter didn’t need to be the fastest guy on the team but, rather, the one with the best on-base skills. Likewise, a club’s best hitter should bat second and not third, since, among other reasons, the two-hole will get more at-bats over the course of a season than the three-hole. These ideas were not immediately accepted, but by September 2023, they were firmly entrenched: “For the first time in the Live Ball Era of AL/NL baseball (since 1920), the second spot in the order is more productive on a relative basis than the third spot. That actually undersells it; for the first time in that history, the second spot is the most productive spot in the order.”
The implications of this shift, however, outstrip statistical niceties. The on-field application of studies such as “The Book” demonstrates that managerial strategy is no longer a matter of time-honored assumptions and visceral intuitions; rather, it’s rooted in analytics. Normally, this sort of analytical work involves the assessment of individual players. To cite but one instance, there has been significant debate in Philadelphia Phillies circles about the construction of the lineup. Should Kyle Schwarber, known for his power hitting and elite on-base skills, hit leadoff? Or should it be Trea Turner, one of the fastest players in baseball who, even in his best years, strikes out far more than he walks? But in this piece, I want to zoom out, as it were, and take a broader approach to the issue. Imagine a manager who is pondering how to fill out his lineup card. Sure, he will consider who should hit leadoff and so on, but he also has to ask the larger question: What sort of batting order, taken as a whole, is most likely to play winning baseball? Is it one tilted towards producing extra-base hits? Or batting average? Or perhaps speed? What’s the formula, as it were, for putting a first-rate lineup on the field?
In order to address this question, I want to see what winning teams consistently do well at the plate. So, let’s start with the winning teams. I will include their overall records, their respective triple slash lines (BA/OBP/SLG), and where they ranked in MLB:
Top Five Regular-Season Records 2023
- Atlanta Braves (104-58): .276 (1st)/.344 (1st)/.501 (1st)
- Baltimore Orioles (101-61): .255 (8th)/.321 (tied 11th)/.421 (tied 10th)
- Los Angeles Dodgers (100-62): .257 (6th)/.340 (2nd)/.455 (2nd)
- Tampa Bay Rays (99-63): .260 (3rd) / .331 (tied 4th) / .445 (4th)
- Texas Rangers (90-72): .263 (2nd) / .337 (3rd) / .452 (3rd)
Top Five Regular-Season Records 2024
- Los Angeles Dodgers (98-64): .258 (4th)/.335 (2nd)/.446 (1st)
- Philadelphia Phillies (95-67): .257 (5th)/.325 (5th)/.425 (5th)
- New York Yankees (94-68): .248 (tied 8th)/.333 (3rd)/.429 (4th)
- Milwaukee Brewers (93-69): .248 (tied 8th)/.326 (4th)/.403 (tied 12th)
- San Diego Padres (93-69): .263 (tied 1st)/.324 (6th)/.418 (7th)
Top Five Regular-Season Records 2025
- Milwaukee Brewers (97–65): .258 (tied 2nd)/.332 (tied 2nd)/.403 (10th)
- Philadelphia Phillies (96–66): .258 (tied 2nd)/.328 (3rd)/.431 (tied 4th)
- New York Yankees (94–68): .251 (tied 5th)/.332 (tied 2nd)/.455 (1st)
- Toronto Blue Jays (94–68): .265 (1st)/.333 (1st)/.427 (tied 6th)
- Los Angeles Dodgers (93–69): .253 (tied 4th)/.327 (4th)/.441 (2nd)
What can be gleaned from this list? First, in the broadest possible sense, it’s clear that good teams hit well. Though baseball’s cognoscenti have long hailed pitching as the most important factor in the sport, and despite the advantages that recent technological developments have afforded pitchers, the teams that hit the best win the most. Of course, in and of itself, this is not surprising. What may be more surprising is the relative importance of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage.
Fifteen teams are listed above, and 14 of them finished in the top six in MLB in OBP. In fact, nine out of 15 had top-three finishes, with an average OBP finish of 3.5. Average and slugging percentage were less important, relatively speaking. 12 of the 15 teams listed above finished in the top six in MLB in average, while seven out of 15 had top-three finishes, with an average BA finish of four. Finally, 11 of the 15 teams finished in the top six in slugging percentage and six of the 15 had top-three finishes, with an average slugging percentage finish of 4.8. Put in starker terms, 60% of these teams placed in the top three in OBP, while only 40% placed in the top three in slugging percentage, meaning (among other things) that elite teams were 50% more likely to sport an elite OBP rather than an elite slugging percentage. The matter becomes even clearer if we zoom out to top-six finishes: that 14 of 15 elite teams were in the top six in OBP indicates, that regardless of whether a team won 92 games or 105 games, virtually all of the best teams in baseball were near the top of the league in getting on base.
So, if we again imagine Pop Fisher making out his batting order, his biggest decision is not where to hit Hobbs (I myself would hit him in the two-hole, but that’s a different question) but which collection of hitters produces his highest OBP. But now, alas, Fisher has another problem. OBP is the outcome that best correlates with successful baseball, but, in and of itself, it says nothing about the process that leads to high OBP numbers. It’s possible, after all, that elite OBP teams are also luckier than others — a quality that the ornery Fisher, who frequently grumbles “I shoulda been a farmer,” is sure he’s lacking. Is there an additional metric that might shed light on how great teams approach their at-bats?
That number is Chase% (or O-Swing%), defined as “the number of out of the zone pitches a hitter swings at divided by the total number of out of the zone pitches the hitter faces.” On an individual basis, Chase% indicates which hitters are best and worst at recognizing strikes and balls. The league average is 30%, meaning that the average hitter will swing at three out of every 10 pitches he sees outside of the strike zone. The lowest values hover around 15%, while even the freest of free swingers won’t swing at half of the balls they see.
Yet, while Chase% can help identify a particular player’s ability to control the strike zone, to what extent does it correlate with a team’s success? The evidence is intriguing. In 2023, the Texas Rangers led MLB in Chase% (25.5%); they won the World Series. In 2024, the Dodgers finished second in Chase % (25.7%); they won the World Series. In 2025, the Dodgers finished third in Chase% (26.1%); they won the World Series.
Now, admittedly, Chase% doesn’t correspond with baseball success as neatly as OBP does. To take one example, here are the top three teams in Chase% in 2023:
- Texas Rangers (90-72): 25.5%
- Pittsburgh Pirates (76-86): 25.6%
- San Diego Padres (82-80): 25.8%
Still, upon closer inspection, this list is revealing. As indicated, the Rangers won the World Series, while the Padres were a contact-oriented team (eighth-fewest strikeouts in MLB) hampered by a season of bad luck (27th-lowest BABIP in the league) and a 4-9 record against the dreaded Dodgers. The Pittsburgh Pirates, however, were a particularly interesting case, sporting a very low Chase% and a losing record. But this juxtaposition, in and of itself, misses how much the Pirates had improved from the season before. In 2022, the Pirates were 62-100, featuring a Chase% of 28.1%. In 2023, they were markedly better in Chase% and, unsurprisingly, won 14 more games across the regular season. Even a weak team, then, will be less weak if it will refuse to swing at pitches outside of the strike zone.
Thus we have two offensive numbers that are especially predictive of winning baseball. In terms of outcomes, OBP is king, whereas, in terms of process, Chase% is most important. They are by no means identical. As the Pirates’ 2023 case illustrates, a team can have an elite process but not necessarily elite outcomes (the Pirates’ 2023 OBP was a mediocre .315), most likely due to a talent gap. Still, if we set OBP and Chase% in relationship, we can get a fresh perspective on how successful outcomes and successful processes interact. Let’s call this plate control score (PCS). It provides a measure of a team’s ability to consistently reach base while refusing to expand the strike zone.
I will define PCS as OBP (converted into a percentage) minus Chase%, resulting in a simple score that will help us distinguish between teams (or players) who dictate at-bats and those who mainly endure them. Consider the 2025 Phillies: the team finished third in OBP (.328, converted here to 32.8) but had a poor Chase% (30.3%). Thus they finished with a pedestrian PCS of 2.5 — a number that reflects (or, indeed, predicts) the club’s recent struggles in October. During the same season, the Dodgers, who defeated the Phillies in 2025 NL Division Series, featured an excellent PCS of 6.6 (32.7-26.1). If we flesh this out a bit more, the findings are illuminating:
Top 10 Teams in PCS in 2025
| Rank | Team | OBP | Chase% | PCS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Milwaukee Brewers | .332 | 25.5% | 7.7 |
| 2 | New York Yankees | .332 | 25.6% | 7.6 |
| 3 | Los Angeles Dodgers | .327 | 26.1% | 6.6 |
| 4 | New York Mets | .326 | 26.5% | 6.1 |
| 5 | Chicago Cubs | .320 | 26.6% | 5.4 |
| 6 | Cincinnati Reds | .315 | 26.7% | 4.8 |
| 7 | Atlanta Braves | .320 | 27.7% | 4.3 |
| 8 | Pittsburgh Pirates | .305 | 26.4% | 4.1 |
| 9 | Toronto Blue Jays | .333 | 29.3% | 4.0 |
| 10 | San Francisco Giants | .311 | 27.2% | 3.9 |
The Brewers had the best regular-season record — and the best PCS. The Dodgers won the World Series — and featured the game’s third-best PCS. In fact, only one team on this list had a record below .500, namely, the Pirates (71-91), who yet again proved that even an elite PCS cannot overcome a huge gap in talent. As the Pirates continue to add players such as Konnor Griffin, a young shortstop with massive offensive upside, they should see their win-loss record begin to match the organization’s obvious emphasis on plate discipline. Another curious case here is the Blue Jays, who pushed the Dodgers to seven games in the World Series. During the regular season, the Blue Jays had a (slightly) better record and a better team OBP than the Dodgers, and yet the Dodgers had a noticeably better PCS than the Blue Jays. What’s interesting is that, in one of the most competitive World Series in recent memory, this advantage in plate discipline carried over to the World Series. Even though the Blue Jays (.269/.347/.398) hit better than the Dodgers (.203/.294/.364) over the course of the Series, the latter team actually saw more pitches per plate appearance (3.87 vs. 3.83 ). Despite a poor offensive performance, the Dodgers made the Blue Jays’ pitchers work just a bit harder — a minuscule advantage that just may have tilted the scales in the Dodgers’ favor.
Regardless, it’s clear that plate discipline is not just one thing to consider when devising a batting order, it is the main thing to consider. PCS is one (but not the only) way to convert this insight into quantifiable terms. Pop Fisher may not have understood it, but that’s no reason to ignore one of the secrets to fielding a winning baseball club. We can’t all have a Roy Hobbs to bail us out.
